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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Jestyn G. Payne, successor custodian for shares of stock 
owned by L.L., a minor, appeals from an order of the District 
Court affirming the Bankruptcy Court‟s order dismissing an 
adversary proceeding that Payne brought against the debtor, 
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Harold C. Lampe, Jr. (“Harold”), the prior custodian for the 
shares, and sustaining Harold‟s objections to Payne‟s proof of 
claim.  In the Bankruptcy Court, Payne sought to recover 
$345,000 from Harold, claiming that Harold breached his 
fiduciary duties owed to L.L. when he secured and retained that 
sum in partial satisfaction of a judgment that he obtained against 
WEL Management, Inc. (“WEL”), a family business of which 
he was a director and in which he and L.L. were the 
shareholders of record.  In particular, Harold held one WEL 
share and was the custodian for L.L. of nine WEL shares, the 
remaining 90% of its outstanding shares.  Despite the potentially 
conflicting interests between his role both as a WEL director 
and custodian of L.L.‟s shares on the one hand, and his status as 
a creditor of WEL on the other, the District Court and the 
Bankruptcy Court determined that Harold did not breach his 
fiduciary duties either as a WEL director or as the custodian for 
L.L.‟s shares when he secured the judgment and partially 
obtained satisfaction for it from the sale of WEL‟s assets.  For 
the following reasons, we will reverse. 
 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 A. The Lampe Family Businesses 
 In approximately 1983, Harold, a paper salesman for a 
company not involved in this case, wrote a book about problems 
associated with the use of paper in commercial printing 
operations.  About two years later, Harold and his son William 
Lampe (“William”) started Paper Complaints, Inc. (“PCI-1”), a 
  4 
Pennsylvania corporation, to market Harold‟s book and to 
provide consulting services to the printing industry.  Harold and 
William were PCI-1‟s sole shareholders.  After they formed 
PCI-1, Harold continued to work as a paper salesman while 
William ran PCI-1‟s day-to-day operations.  Between 1985 and 
1991, Harold made loans to PCI-1 to assist its business, either 
by writing checks to PCI-1 or paying bills on its behalf.  
Although there were no written agreements memorializing the 
terms of the loans, Harold testified in the Bankruptcy Court that 
he and William agreed that PCI-1 would repay the loans with 
around nine or ten percent interest.     
 Around 1985 William married Theresa Lampe 
(“Theresa”) and during the marriage, L.L. was born.  In 1991 
William told Harold that Theresa wanted to start a new 
company, Printing Consulting, Inc. (“PCI-2”), that Theresa and 
William would own equally, to replace PCI-1.  Harold agreed to 
the arrangement on the condition that the loans he had made to 
PCI-1 were repaid.  In 1992, as agreed, PCI-1 ceased operating 
and William and Theresa formed PCI-2, another Pennsylvania 
corporation to take its place.  Nevertheless, Harold‟s loans were 
not repaid.  PCI-2 engaged in the same kind of business as PCI-
1 but it differed to the extent that it focused more on consulting 
services than on selling Harold‟s book.  Between 1991 and 
2003, Harold made loans to PCI-2, both to help with the 
formation of the company and with its ongoing operations.  As 
had been the case with Harold‟s loans to PCI-1, there was no 
documentation evidencing his loans to PCI-2.  Harold testified 
at the adversary proceeding, however, that he made the loans 
with the understanding that, like his loans to PCI-1, they would 
be repaid at nine or ten percent interest.  In total, Harold lent 
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almost $300,000 to PCI-1 and PCI-2.  
 In addition to forming PCI-2, between 1991 and 2003 
William and Theresa formed or acquired a number of other 
closely-held Pennsylvania corporations as well as substantial 
real estate holdings.  As significant here, in 1991 William and 
Theresa formed WEL to provide a variety of services to the 
couple‟s other businesses.  William, Theresa, and Harold were 
WEL‟s directors.  WEL made intercompany financial transfers, 
provided accounting services to PCI-2, and made investments.  
Theresa was primarily responsible for running WEL and served 
as its president, while William devoted his time to PCI-2 and 
GTP Plastics, another company that he and Theresa owned.  As 
we stated above, WEL issued one share of stock to Harold 
around the time that it was formed,
1
 and, in addition, issued a 
certificate dated January 14, 1993—soon after L.L.‟s birth—that 
certified that it had issued nine shares of stock to Harold  as 
custodian for L.L. under the Pennsylvania Uniform Gifts to 
Minors Act, the predecessor to the Pennsylvania Uniform 
Transfers to Minors Act. 
 B. Harold‟s Lawsuits and Judgment Against WEL 
                                                 
1
 According to William, the stock in WEL was issued to Harold 
because when William and Theresa formed that corporation 
neither “could really take ownership in anything based on the 
workouts that we were dealing with [with a creditor] . . . so . . . 
we put the shares in with [Harold.]”  App. at 239.  It seems 
evident, however, that William and Theresa regarded themselves 
as the real owners of WEL. 
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Eventually Harold came to believe that WEL was using 
and managing some of the money he was lending to PCI-2.
2
  
The evidence in the Bankruptcy Court adversary proceeding 
showed that PCI-2 made significant payments to WEL marked 
as “loans,” but there was no evidence that WEL ever repaid 
PCI-2 for any loans.  Notably, the Bankruptcy Court found that 
PCI-2 transferred income to WEL for the purpose of making 
payments to Royal Bank on a loan that the bank made to a 
Lampe company, apparently GTP Plastics.
3
   
 In September of 2002, Harold filed a state court action 
against WEL, PCI-2, William, Theresa, and several other 
entities, seeking repayment of his loans.  Theresa retained 
separate counsel to represent her and WEL in this litigation.  
Harold, however, dismissed the 2002 lawsuit without prejudice. 
 At the adversary proceeding, Harold offered several reasons to 
the Bankruptcy Court explaining why he dismissed the 2002 
lawsuit, including one explanation that Harold‟s lawyer was “in 
over her head,” and another that William told him that the 
lawsuit was interfering with divorce proceedings then pending 
between Theresa and him.  App. at 208.    
 On December 8, 2003, Harold and William held a WEL 
                                                 
2
 The loans to PCI-2 were separate from a loan that Harold 
claims he made to WEL. 
 
3
 We find the circumstances surrounding the bank loan to be 
unclear, but we believe that GTP Plastics was the obligor on the 
bank loan.  In any event, our result does not depend on the 
details of the loan. 
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directors‟ meeting to remove Theresa as its president though 
they did not remove her as a director at that time.  Harold 
testified that he called the meeting because Theresa had 
defaulted on all of WEL‟s bank loans and he and William 
needed to regain access to company records.  The Bankruptcy 
Court found that “there is no evidence in the record that 
[Harold] agreed to vote Theresa out as President of WEL so that 
he could obtain a judgment against WEL for the loans that had 
[been] made to [PCI-1] or [PCI-2].” 4 App. at 35.   
 On May 28, 2004, Harold filed a second loan repayment 
lawsuit against WEL and PCI-2 in the Court of Common Pleas 
of Berks County, Pennsylvania.  Harold alleged in this action 
that PCI-2 owed him over $800,000, consisting of nearly 
$300,000 in loan principal and over $500,000 in interest 
calculated at ten percent per year.  Harold asserted that he also 
had lent WEL $31,000 by borrowing from his personal line of 
credit and that WEL now owed him over $96,000, a figure that 
included accrued interest.  Though Harold  acknowledges that 
he had made the bulk of the loans to PCI-2, as we have indicated 
he claimed that William and Theresa diverted PCI-2‟s funds to 
WEL and thus PCI-2‟s and WEL‟s funds were commingled.  He 
                                                 
4
 Though we do not make a finding that Harold sought to remove 
Theresa as president of WEL so that he could obtain a judgment 
against that corporation, we point out that, contrary to what the 
Bankruptcy Court seemed to believe, it is reasonable to draw an 
inference that he sought to remove Theresa for that precise 
purpose.  After all, he knew that she had contested his original 
action and thus he had reason to believe that she would oppose 
his second action as well.  
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therefore contended that PCI-2 and WEL were alter egos so that 
the court should pierce the corporate veil between them and 
regard them as a single entity.  William, who by this time was 
running WEL‟s affairs, accepted service of process in Harold‟s 
action on behalf of both PCI-2 and WEL, but he did not take any 
action to defend either corporation in the case.  In the adversary 
proceeding, William testified that he did not defend the 
corporations against the lawsuit “because there was no means 
[by] which even [to] try to defend it.  There was no money.”  
App. at 254.   
 Ultimately, Harold obtained default judgments in the 
state court against PCI-2 and WEL in the amounts of 
$1,107,550.09 and $1,204,439.12, respectively.  Though 
William has contended otherwise, the Bankruptcy Court 
believed that Theresa was not aware of the case when Harold 
initiated the Berks County lawsuit and did become aware of it 
until late in 2004 after Harold obtained the judgments.  She 
testified in the Bankruptcy Court that if she had known about 
Harold‟s lawsuit, she would have hired counsel separately to 
defend against it.  This testimony seems credible because she 
had retained counsel to defend against Harold‟s earlier action. 
 On March 25, 2005, Harold commenced execution 
proceedings on his judgment against property that WEL owned 
on Reading Avenue in Boyertown, Pennsylvania, and
 
on July 8, 
2005, Harold purchased the parcel at a sheriff‟s sale.5  He then 
                                                 
5
 Payne contends that the execution against the Reading Avenue 
property appropriated all of WEL‟s assets as he states that “[t]he 
sale [was of] WEL‟s only assets.”  Appellant‟s br. at 17.  
  9 
resold the property for $345,000, and retained approximately 
$320,000 in net proceeds.  Thus, his judgment was partially 
satisfied.
6
 
 C. The Present Litigation 
 On August 6, 2008, by order of the Court of Common 
Pleas of Berks County, Orphan‟s Court Division, Payne 
                                                                                                             
Therefore, according to Payne, Harold converted the assets of 
WEL to himself, leaving WEL “a worthless entity and an empty 
shell.”  Id.  The Bankruptcy Court‟s findings that “WEL still 
owned other properties at this time” contradicts this contention.  
App. at 47.  Overall the uncertainty as to the identification of 
WEL‟s assets makes it unclear what WEL was worth in March 
2005 or the share of its assets that the Reading Avenue property 
constituted.  It is, however, clear that L.L. through her 
ownership of WEL shares had a significant indirect financial 
interest in that property that its sale price demonstrated was 
valuable. 
 
6
 We are treating the proceeds of the resale rather than the lesser 
amount for which Harold acquired the property at the sheriff‟s 
sale as a partial satisfaction of the judgment because Harold 
apparently regards the proceeds of the resale in that light.  We 
are aware that arguably in a legal sense only the proceeds of the 
sheriff‟s sale itself should be treated as having satisfied the 
judgment but for purposes of this opinion it is immaterial which 
sale price is regarded as having partially satisfied the judgment. 
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succeeded Harold as custodian for L.L‟s shares in WEL.7  After 
conducting an investigation, Payne concluded that Harold 
wrongfully deprived L.L. of the value of her shares when he 
sued WEL and secured a judgment against it and then obtained 
partial satisfaction of the judgment from a sale of its assets.  
 On October 24, 2008, Payne, as custodian for L.L.‟s 
shares, commenced an action in the Berks County Court of 
Common Pleas against Harold, William, WEL, and other Lampe 
family businesses.  This lawsuit included claims against Harold 
for breach of his fiduciary duties as the previous custodian for 
L.L.‟s shares and as a WEL director, alleging that Harold 
engaged in self-dealing and other malfeasance when he sued 
WEL and secured partial satisfaction of the judgment that he 
obtained from the sale of its assets, particularly to the extent that 
it was PCI-2 that was the obligor on the debt owed Harold.  
Payne stated that Harold‟s allegation in his 2004 litigation that 
led to the judgment against WEL that WEL and PCI-2 were alter 
egos was a sham.  He further contended that he could 
demonstrate that if the officers and directors of WEL had 
exercised reasonable care, they could have defended WEL 
successfully against Harold‟s case insofar as Harold sought to 
hold WEL liable for his loans to PCI-2.  It is obvious that the 
recognition of WEL and PCI-2 as alter egos was significant for, 
as WEL‟s ownership of the Reading Avenue property 
demonstrated, WEL owned substantial assets, unlike PCI-2. 
 On December 4, 2008, less than two months after Payne 
                                                 
7
 The parties do not set forth the details of the proceedings 
leading to Payne‟s appointment as the custodian. 
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initiated his litigation, Harold filed a Voluntary Petition for 
Relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the 
Bankruptcy Court that automatically stayed Payne‟s Berks 
County litigation.
8
  See 11 U.S.C. § 362.  In his schedules in the 
bankruptcy case, Harold listed Payne as a creditor with a 
disputed claim in the amount of $345,000.  On January 15, 
2009, Payne filed an unsecured claim in the bankruptcy case for 
$500,000 and, on the same day, he commenced an adversary 
proceeding largely tracking his stayed Berks County action.  The 
adversary complaint sought:  (1) a judgment in the amount of 
$345,000 against Harold; (2) the allowance of a claim in the 
same amount based on the judgment that Payne sought; and (3) a 
determination that the debt underlying the claim was not 
dischargeable because Harold engaged in fraud or defalcation 
while acting in a fiduciary capacity.  See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).  
Harold filed objections to Payne‟s proof of claim and contended 
that the claim was not entitled to be treated as prima facie valid 
under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(c) and (f).  
Harold predicated this contention on the circumstance that the 
proof of claim did not include any attachments or factual 
explanation for the claim other than a generalized allegation that 
Harold had engaged in “fraud and breach of fiduciary duties.”  
App. at 48. 
The Bankruptcy Court consolidated the adversary 
proceeding and Harold‟s objections to Payne‟s proof of claim 
and held a bench trial in the consolidated proceedings on April 9 
and 12, 2010.  On November 19, 2010, the Court issued an 
                                                 
8
 Payne unsuccessfully sought relief from the stay so that he 
could pursue the Berks County case. 
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opinion and order upholding Harold‟s objection to Payne‟s 
claim and entering judgment on the adversary complaint in 
Harold‟s favor. 
 At the threshold of its opinion, the Bankruptcy Court 
concluded that Payne‟s proof of claim was not entitled to prima 
facie validity as it agreed with Harold that Payne did not file 
documentation to establish his connection to Harold or to 
support the claim.  The Court also noted:  
In any event, even if Payne‟s claim was given 
prima facie effect, the Court would rule in the 
same manner on the Objection.  The Debtor 
[Harold] provided evidence which refutes Payne‟s 
contention that he breached his fiduciary duties.  
Moreover, there is no evidence that the debtor 
committed fraud. 
App. at 50 n.28.  In addressing the substance of the claim, the 
Bankruptcy Court framed the issues as follows: 
In order to find that Payne has a claim against the 
estate in the amount of $345,000, the Court must 
find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that:  (i) 
[Harold] was the custodian of nine (9) shares of 
stock in WEL for his granddaughter, [L.L.]; and 
(ii) that [Harold] breached his fiduciary duty to 
[L.L.] in his role as a director of WEL or as the 
custodian for her of her WEL stock. 
App. at 50.  The Court determined that Harold was the custodian 
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for L.L.‟s shares when he obtained the judgment that led to the 
sale of the Reading Avenue property and he was aware of the 
custodianship.
9
  Harold does not challenge those findings on this 
appeal.  The Court thereafter focused its discussion on the issue 
of whether Harold breached his fiduciary duties under 
Pennsylvania law.  
 The Bankruptcy Court began its breach of fiduciary duty 
analysis by noting that as a WEL director Harold owed the 
corporation
10
 the familiar fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.  
                                                 
9
 In the Bankruptcy Court Harold argued that L.L. did not own 
the nine WEL shares because:  (1) the Pennsylvania Uniform 
Gift to Minors Act did not exist when the shares were issued to 
her, (2) he did not consent to being the custodian for the shares, 
and (3) at relevant times William and Theresa held themselves 
out either as sole or co-equal shareholders of WEL.   The 
Bankruptcy Court did not find any of these arguments 
persuasive and concluded that Harold was the custodian of the 
shares. 
 
10
 Under Pennsylvania law, a director ordinarily owes his 
fiduciary duties to the corporation rather than to its individual 
shareholders.  15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 517 (West 2011);  see 
In re Insulfoams, Inc., 184 B.R. 694, 703 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1995).  After noting that Harold did not object, the Bankruptcy 
Court accepted Payne‟s characterization of the adversary 
proceeding as a shareholder‟s derivative action.  Accordingly, 
Payne stands in the shoes of WEL for purposes of his breach of 
fiduciary duties claim, and we must analyze the question of 
whether the corporation would have such a claim against 
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See 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 512(a), 1712 (West 2011); 
Anchel v. Shea, 762 A.2d 346, 357 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).  Next, 
after stating that the test for liability for breach of fiduciary duty, 
but not distinguishing between the duties of care and loyalty, is 
whether a director was unjustly enriched by his actions, the 
Court concluded that Harold was not unjustly enriched by the 
sale of the Reading Avenue property and his retention of the 
proceeds of the sale because the Court believed that Harold‟s 
judgment was based on a legitimate claim against WEL.  Thus, 
the Court indicated that “[i]n seeking a judgment against WEL 
for his loans and in executing on that judgment against real 
property which WEL owned, [Harold] exercised his right to 
obtain what he was validly owed.”  App. at 46.  See Seaboard 
Indus., Inc. v. Monaco, 276 A.2d 305, 309 (Pa. 1971).  Though 
the Court held that Harold also owed L.L. fiduciary duties under 
the Pennsylvania Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, see 20 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5312 (West 2011), it concluded that he did 
not breach those duties because, as it held with respect to 
Harold‟s duties to WEL, he “exercised his right to obtain what 
he was validly owed.”  App. at 46.  Thus, the Court entered an 
order dismissing Payne‟s adversary proceeding and upholding 
Harold‟s objections to Payne‟s proof of claim.11 
                                                                                                             
Harold.   
 
11
 Having granted the objection, the Bankruptcy Court did not 
address the issue of dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) 
as there was no debt to discharge.  We thus are perplexed by 
Payne‟s argument that “[t]he bankruptcy court and the district 
court erred in finding that [L.L.‟s] claims against Harold were 
  15 
 Payne appealed to the District Court but it affirmed and 
in doing so adopted the Bankruptcy Court‟s reasoning.  Payne 
then appealed to this Court.  
 
III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 157 and 1334, the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 158(a), and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and 28 U.S.C. 158(d).  We exercise plenary review of the 
District Court‟s order and, like that Court, apply a clearly 
erroneous standard of review to the Bankruptcy Court‟s factual 
findings and review its conclusions of law de novo.  In re 
Siciliano, 13 F.3d 748, 750 (3d Cir. 1994).  In effect, we are 
reviewing the Bankruptcy Court‟s disposition of this case. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 A. Burdens of Proof for an Objection to a 
Proof of Claim 
                                                                                                             
dischargeable.”  Appellant‟s br. at 18.  Though as a practical 
matter there may not be a difference between a holding that 
there is no debt as the Court held in the adversary proceeding, 
and a holding that a debt is dischargeable, they simply are not 
the same thing.  
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 Payne argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred in holding 
that his proof of claim was not entitled to prima facie validity.  
We agree.  “The burden of proof for claims brought in the 
bankruptcy court . . . rests on different parties at different 
times.”  In re Allegheny Int‟l, Inc., 954 F.2d 167, 173 (3d Cir. 
1992).   Under section 502(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, a proof 
of claim “is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest . . . 
objects.”  11 U.S.C. § 502(a).  Bankruptcy Court Rule 3001(f) 
provides: “A proof of claim executed and filed in accordance 
with these rules shall constitute prima facie evidence of the 
validity and the amount of the claim.”   Therefore, a proof of 
claim that alleges sufficient facts to support liability satisfies the 
claimant‟s initial obligation to proceed, after which the burden 
shifts to the objector to produce sufficient evidence to negate the 
prima facie validity of the filed claim.  Allegheny Int‟l, 954 F.2d 
at 173-74.  Nevertheless, the claimant always has the burden of 
persuasion in a contested proceeding.  Id. at 174.        
 Payne takes issue with the Bankruptcy Court‟s conclusion 
that his proof of claim was subject to Bankruptcy Rule 3001(c).  
That rule provides: 
When a claim, or an interest in property of the 
debtor securing the claim, is based on a writing, 
the original or a duplicate shall be filed with the 
proof of claim.  If the writing has been lost or 
destroyed, a statement of the circumstances of the 
loss or destruction shall be filed with the claim. 
We agree with Payne that Rule 3001(c) was inapplicable to his 
claim inasmuch as he did not base the claim on a writing, but 
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rather advanced his claim on what are essentially state law tort 
principles.   See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 (1979) 
(“One standing in a fiduciary relation with another is subject to 
liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty 
imposed by the relation.”).  We reach this conclusion because 
even though we have not addressed comprehensively the 
meaning of “writing,” and Rule 3001(c) does not define that 
term, courts have observed that the rule only applies when a 
writing created the purported obligation and is not applicable 
merely because a document might play some role in establishing 
the claim.  See In Re Los Angeles Int‟l Airport Hotel Assoc., 
106 F.3d 1479, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Rule 3001(c) is invoked 
where the obligation itself, and not its consequent enforcement, 
is based upon a writing.”);  In re Fuller, 204 B.R. 894, 898 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that a claim based on an IRS 
tax lien was not “based on a writing,” but rather on federal 
statutes).   
Harold argues that Payne based his claim on multiple 
writings, including  Payne‟s earlier state-court complaint, 
documents relating to the sheriff‟s sale of the Reading Avenue 
property, and the shareholder‟s certificate establishing Harold‟s 
custodianship for L.L.‟s nine shares.  While these documents 
have evidentiary value in establishing Payne‟s claim, they do not 
demonstrate that Harold engaged in unlawful conduct and we 
see no way to hold that they created Harold‟s obligation.  If we 
adopted Harold‟s argument with respect to the scope of Rule 
3000(c) we would subject every claim in which a writing could 
play any role to the requirements of that rule.  The rule is meant 
to “provide the debtor with fair notice of the conduct, 
transaction, and occurrences that form the basis of the claim.”  
  18 
In re O‟Brien, 440 B.R. 654, 662 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010)  
(quoting In re Sandifier, 318 B.R. 601, 611 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Clearly, Harold had 
that notice.  We are satisfied that within the context of Rule 
3000(c) the writings here cannot be equated functionally to, for 
example, a promissory note on which a debtor is the obligor.  
Therefore, inasmuch as we conclude that Payne‟s proof of claim 
was not “based on a writing,” he was not required to attach 
documentation to the claim, and thus his claim was entitled to 
prima facie validity.  See In Re Los Angeles, 106 F.3d at 1480.
12
 
  
 B. Harold‟s Duties as a WEL Director 
 Payne‟s next assertion of error is that the Bankruptcy 
Court erred in its determination that Harold did not breach his 
                                                 
12
 Although we conclude that Payne‟s claim was entitled to 
prima facie validity, even if we treated his claim as an ordinary 
civil complaint our result on this appeal would not differ from 
that we reach.  Consequently, though we reach an opposite result 
on the merits of this case from that of the Bankruptcy Court, we 
follow its approach in not predicating its conclusion on a 
presumption when it explained that “even if Payne‟s claim was 
given prima facie effect, the Court would still rule in the same 
manner on the objection.”  App. at 50 n.28.  We take this 
approach because though there are many facts in dispute in this 
case the facts that we regard as controlling are not in dispute and 
we are resolving the case through the application of legal 
principles.  Thus, this case does not turn on the prima facie 
validity of Payne‟s claim. 
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fiduciary duties as a WEL director.  “The basic federal rule in 
bankruptcy is that state law governs the substance of claims, 
Congress generally having left the determination of property 
rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law.”  Raleigh 
v. Ill. Dep‟t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20, 120 S.Ct. 1951, 1955 
(2000) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).   
 Section 512 of Pennsylvania‟s Business Corporation Law 
states: 
A director of a domestic corporation shall stand in 
a fiduciary relation to the corporation and shall 
perform his duties as a director . . . in good faith, 
in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the 
best interests of the corporation and with such 
care, including reasonable inquiry, skill and 
diligence, as a person of ordinary prudence would 
use under similar circumstances.   
15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 512(a); see also 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 1712(a).  A director‟s duty of care requires him to 
“discharge duties to the corporation with the same diligence, 
care, and skill which ordinary prudent persons exercise in their 
personal affairs; failure to exercise such care renders any 
corporate director liable for resulting corporate losses.”    In re 
Main, Inc., 239 B.R. 281, 291 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999).  A 
director also owes a corporation a second duty, a duty of loyalty, 
which requires him in dealing with the affairs of the corporation 
to promote the interests of the corporation rather than his own 
interests.  See Anchel, 762 A.2d at 357; Fitzpatrick v. Shay, 461 
A.2d 243 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). 
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  1. Duty of Care 
The Bankruptcy Court rejected Payne‟s claim predicated 
on Harold‟s alleged breach of his duty of care as it concluded 
that because Harold had not been unjustly enriched by his 
actions, he could not be liable on the basis of breach of fiduciary 
duty.  In this regard, the Court concluded that “the test for 
liability for breach of fiduciary duty is whether a director was 
unjustly enriched by his actions.”  App. at 54.  We think, 
however, that the Court‟s conclusion misapplied Pennsylvania 
case law as we are satisfied that, although when there is a breach 
of fiduciary duty a culpable fiduciary well may have been 
unjustly enriched, the party charging the fiduciary with breach 
of duty need not always show that the fiduciary has been 
unjustly enriched by his conduct.  
At the outset of our duty of care discussion we quote 
from a leading Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in which 
that court focused on unjust enrichment.  We start at this point 
because, as we have indicated, the Bankruptcy Court believed 
that the absence of such enrichment was critical in this case.  In 
that decision, Bailey v. Jacobs, 189 A. 320 (Pa. 1937), the 
Supreme Court explained: 
Directors and officers occupy toward stockholders 
what is commonly characterized as a fiduciary 
relationship.  They must act in the utmost good 
faith, and cannot deal with the funds and property 
of the corporation, nor utilize the influence and 
advantage of their offices, for any but the 
common interest.  If they make a personal profit 
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through the use of corporate assets, they must 
account for it to the stockholders.  It is immaterial 
that their dealings may not have caused a loss or 
been harmful to the corporation; the test of 
liability is whether they have unjustly gained 
enrichment. 
Id. at 324.  Although after Bailey courts applying Pennsylvania 
law have continued to consider whether there has been unjust 
enrichment when certain breach of loyalty claims are advanced, 
the courts have not required a showing of unjust enrichment in 
every case involving the related but distinct claim of breach of 
fiduciary duty predicated on the fiduciary‟s lack of due care.  
See In re Main, 239 B.R. at 290 (holding that corporate directors 
breached their fiduciary responsibilities because they failed to 
show that the transactions were in the best interests of the 
company, without addressing whether those directors were 
unjustly enriched).  It is logical that Bailey should not be applied 
in cases involving breach of care claims as that case dealt with 
the misappropriation of a business opportunity and a director 
certainly can breach his fiduciary duties including the duty of 
care by other conduct.  Thus, well-established corporate law 
recognizes that a director can breach his duty of care by 
mismanaging a corporation to its detriment even though he does 
not obtain any benefit from his mismanagement.  See Selheimer 
v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 224 A.2d 634, 647 (Pa. 1966) 
(holding directors liable to the corporation for losses caused by 
their “negligent and wasteful conduct” in expending undue 
corporate resources on an unprofitable manganese oxide plant).   
Payne contends that Harold breached his duty of care as a 
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WEL director because he did not cause WEL to retain counsel 
and defend itself against his 2004 lawsuit that resulted in the 
judgment against WEL.  Harold counters by invoking the 
business judgment rule.  The business judgment rule, however, 
only insulates a director from liability for decisions made: 
(1) in good faith; (2) where the director or officer 
is not interested in the subject of the business 
judgment; (3) is informed with respect to the 
subject of the business judgment to the extent he 
reasonably believes to be appropriate under the 
circumstances; and (4) rationally believes that the 
business judgment in question is in the best 
interests of the corporation. 
Viener v. Jacobs, 834 A.2d 546, 557 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).  In 
this case, Harold undoubtedly was “interested in the subject of 
the business judgment” and was engaging in self-dealing 
conduct when he sought to satisfy his judgment from the assets 
of WEL and failed to take any steps to procure an attorney for 
WEL to defend against his suit.  Accordingly, the presumption 
afforded by the business judgment rule does not apply to his 
actions in this case.  See 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1716(b) 
(West 2011) (“Absent breach of fiduciary duty, breach of good 
faith or self-dealing, actions taken as a director shall be 
presumed to be in the best interests of the corporation.”). 
After considering the facts of the case, including the 
Bankruptcy Court‟s findings of historical facts, which we 
accept, we hold that Harold breached his duty of care as a WEL 
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director.
13
  Our conclusion does not depend on a showing that he 
was unjustly enriched at WEL‟s expense though, in fact, as we 
will explain, that may have been the case.  Harold protests that 
he did not shoulder the duty to defend WEL alone, and that 
William could have hired an attorney to defend it.
14
  Even if this 
is so, William‟s duties as a WEL director are not at issue here; 
Harold had a duty of care independent of any duty William 
owed with respect to WEL.  See Seaboard Indus., 276 A.2d at 
309 (“[D]irectors and officers of a corporation are jointly as well 
as severally liable for mismanagement, willful neglect or 
misconduct of corporate affairs . . . .”).   Though it might seem 
                                                 
13
 We are aware that the Bankruptcy Court indicated that Harold 
“was, by far, the most credible and convincing witness.”  App. 
at 18.  Though the record can be read to support a conclusion 
that in one important respect Harold‟s testimony might not have 
been completely credible, see supra note 4 and the 
accompanying text, we nevertheless will accept the Court‟s 
assessment but that assessment does not affect our result. 
 
14
 Though, as we noted above, William contended otherwise, the 
Bankruptcy Court believed that Theresa, although also a WEL 
director, did not find out about the 2004 lawsuit and default 
judgment until late 2004.  Thus, she could not have defended 
WEL in the case when Harold filed it, though she might have 
sought to reopen the case when she became aware of it after the 
judgment was entered.  However, to the best of our knowledge 
she did not take any action to challenge the judgment he 
obtained.  But, as we have indicated with respect to William‟s 
inaction, that circumstance does not absolve Harold from 
liability as he owed an independent duty of care to WEL. 
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odd that Harold should have been expected to take steps to 
defend against a lawsuit that he initiated, he was obligated to do 
exactly that at least to the extent of attempting to obtain an 
attorney to represent WEL in the case.  See 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 512(a) (a director must discharge his duties after 
“reasonable inquiry,” and must exercise “reasonable . . . skill 
and diligence.”).  Nevertheless, Harold made no effort to have 
WEL obtain an attorney to attempt to stave off a default 
judgment against WEL of over $1 million and he did nothing to 
ensure that WEL‟s interests were represented at the sheriff‟s 
sale of the Reading Avenue property.   
  Under Pennsylvania law, a director is liable to the 
corporation for breaching his duty of care for “losses which 
were proximately caused by the negligent and wasteful conduct” 
at issue.  See Selheimer, 224 A.2d at 647.  Proximate causation 
is defined as “a wrongful act which was a substantial factor in 
bringing about the plaintiff‟s harm.”  Dudley v. USX Corp., 606 
A.2d 916, 923 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (citations omitted), see 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1965).  Whatever the 
merits of Harold‟s 2004 lawsuit, he did nothing to protect 
WEL‟s interests either in connection with the lawsuit or the sale 
of the Reading Avenue property.
15
  Though we cannot be certain 
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 Harold implies that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine forecloses 
any inquiry into the 2004 litigation.  That doctrine “is implicated 
when, in order to grant the federal plaintiff the relief sought, the 
federal court must determine that the state court judgment was 
erroneously entered or must take action that would render that 
judgment ineffectual.”  See In re Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  However, the 
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of what the outcome would have been if an attorney had 
defended WEL against Harold‟s action, we see no escape from 
the conclusion that, by permitting a default judgment to be 
entered against WEL on which there was execution, Harold 
contributed to the reduction of the value of the corporation.
16
  
We reach our conclusion even though we accept the Bankruptcy 
Court‟s finding that Harold by his lawsuit was seeking to 
recover a valid debt on which he was the obligee.  In this regard, 
we point out that the shortfall in the Bankruptcy Court‟s finding 
is that it did not establish that WEL owed that the entirety of that 
debt to Harold or that PCI-2 and WEL were alter egos.
17
 
                                                                                                             
Rooker- Feldman  doctrine is “narrow” and “applies only in 
limited circumstances.”  Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464-66, 
126 S.Ct. 1198, 1201-02 (2006) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply 
when—as is the case here—a plaintiff asserts an independent 
violation of his rights that does not turn on the correctness of a 
state-court judgment.  See In re Madera, 586 F.3d at 232.   
 
16
 We are not oblivious to the reality that as a practical matter 
directors of large corporations cannot be expected to have day-
by-day responsibility for managing the corporate affairs.  Here, 
however, we are dealing with a closely held family corporation 
with few shareholders and our statements as to Harold‟s 
responsibility with respect to the defense of his case should be 
understood in that context. 
 
17
 The Bankruptcy Court believed that because funds were 
intermingled between PCI-2 and WEL Harold had “a good faith 
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  2. Duty of Loyalty  
 A director‟s duty of loyalty necessitates that he not 
engage in self-dealing.  Directors must advance “the common 
interests and not their own; they cannot directly or indirectly, 
utilize their position to obtain any personal profit or advantage 
other than that enjoyed also by their fellow shareholders.”  Tyler 
v. O‟Neill, 994 F. Supp. 603, 612 (E.D. Pa. 1998).  Pennsylvania 
law in 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1728 (West 2011) spells out a 
statutory explanation of the duty of loyalty: 
(a) General rule.  A contract or transaction 
between a business corporation and one or more 
of its directors or officers or between a business 
corporation and another domestic or foreign 
corporation for profit or not-for-profit, 
partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise 
in which one or more of its directors or officers 
are directors or officers or have a financial or 
other interest, shall not be void or voidable solely 
for that reason, or solely because the director or 
                                                                                                             
basis” for his allegations that “WEL should be held liable for his 
loans” to PCI-2, app. at 5, that because of the siphoning of funds 
Harold “acted within his right in seeking repayment of his loans 
from WEL,” app. at 57, and that Harold “had reasonable 
grounds for asserting his claim in state court to have WEL held 
liable for these loans.”  App. at 59.  We accept these findings 
but they are not dispositive because they do not establish that 
WEL could not have successfully advanced a defense to 
Harold‟s claim. 
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officer is present at or participates in the meeting 
of the board of directors that authorizes the 
contract or transaction, or solely because his or 
their votes are counted for that purpose, if: 
(1) the material facts as to the relationship 
or interest and as to the contract or 
transaction are disclosed or are known to 
the board of directors and the board 
authorizes the contract or transaction by 
the affirmative votes of a majority of the 
disinterested directors even though the 
disinterested directors are less than a 
quorum;  
(2) the material facts as to his relationship 
or interest and as to the contract or 
transaction are disclosed or are known to 
the shareholders entitled to vote thereon 
and the contract or transaction is 
specifically approved in good faith by vote 
of those shareholders; or  
(3) the contract or transaction is fair as to 
the corporation as of the time it is 
authorized, approved or ratified by the 
board of directors or the shareholders.    
 Harold addressed section 1728 by contending that his 
defense does not depend on a showing that its demanding 
requirements were satisfied.  Rather, he contends that his 
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acquisition of the Reading Avenue property did not constitute a 
“contract or transaction” subject to that law.  Appellee‟s br. at 
46.  Though we do not take a position on the question of 
whether section 1728 is a complete statement of a director‟s 
duty of loyalty,
18
 we think that, in substance, Harold‟s purchase 
and resale of the property was a “transaction” subject to section 
1728 and the common law‟s exacting scrutiny of self-dealing.  
Neither of the requirements that section 1728(a)(1) or (a)(2) sets 
forth has been met in this case, and Harold‟s acquisition of the 
Reading Avenue property could not have been fair to WEL as it 
arose out of a default judgment in an action against WEL which 
it never defended.  See In re Athos Steel and Aluminum, Inc., 71 
B.R. 525, 541 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (when a plaintiff makes a 
prima facie showing that the director has a self-interest in a 
transaction, the director must show that the transaction is 
intrinsically fair to the corporation). 
 It is clear that Harold by not taking any steps to assist 
WEL in avoiding a default in a case in which he took actions 
that resulted in the sheriff‟s sale of the Reading Avenue 
property, in the words of Tyler v. O‟Neill, used his “position to 
                                                 
18
 In Warehime Enterprises, Inc. v. Warehime, 731 A.2d 128 
(Pa. 1999), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur 
on the issue of whether section 1728 “defines the outer limits of 
a director‟s fiduciary duties of care, good faith and/or loyalty in 
connection with an interested transaction which the director 
knows will result in unfairness or fraud to the corporation.”  
Ultimately, however, the court did not reach this issue.  
Warehime v. Warehime, 761 A.2d 1138 (Pa. 2000). 
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obtain . . . personal profit or advantage other than that enjoyed 
also by their fellow shareholders.”  994 F. Supp. at 612.  
Although WEL may have been indebted to Harold, he 
contributed to depriving WEL of a substantial asset, perhaps 
unjustifiably as he acquired the Reading Avenue property for 
himself to its detriment.
19
  Accordingly, Harold breached his 
duty of loyalty to WEL. 
As a general rule, “the conduct forbidden in the 
acquisition of interests adverse to the corporation is the 
realization of a profit,” see Weissman v. A. Weissman, Inc., 114 
A.2d 797, 799 (Pa. 1955), and Pennsylvania courts often have 
used the concept of unjust enrichment as a measure of liability 
in this context.  See Seaboard Indus., 276 A.2d at 309.
20
  Thus, 
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 In his May 28, 2004 complaint Harold alleged that he had lent 
$31,000 to WEL and that $65,880.93 interest had accrued on 
that loan.  Harold‟s recovery from the sale of WEL‟s property to 
satisfy in part the Berks County judgment far exceeded the sum 
of those that amounts and thus it would be difficult to argue that 
his wrongful actions merely eliminated WEL‟s debt even 
without regard to the alter ego theory that Harold advanced in 
the Berks County litigation. 
 
20
 In CST, Inc. v. Mark, 520 A.2d 469, 472 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), 
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania noted that unjust enrichment 
is the standard test for corporate fiduciary liability, but affirmed 
the trial court‟s holding that a director breached his duty of 
loyalty where the breach “had been a substantial factor” in 
bringing about harm to the corporation even though the director 
was not unjustly enriched.  We have noted already that 
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although as we have explained, a director may breach his duty of 
due care without being unjustly enriched, a showing of unjust 
enrichment still may be significant in a case involving a claim of 
breach of fiduciary duties, particularly when the duty is of 
loyalty.  A showing of unjust enrichment requires a 
demonstration that:  (1) a benefit was conferred on the 
defendant; (2) the defendant retained that benefit; and (3) it 
would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit 
without paying full value for it.  Schenck v. K.E. David, Ltd., 
666 A.2d 327, 328 (Pa. 1995).  But there is not a rigid formula 
that can be applied in a determination of whether there has been 
unjust enrichment as that determination “depends on the unique 
factual circumstances of each case.”  Safe Auto Ins. Co. v. 
Berlin, 991 A.2d 327, 336 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).  In this 
case, it is clear that by securing the judgment, executing on it, 
acquiring the Reading Avenue property at the sheriff‟s sale, 
reselling the property, and personally taking the proceeds from 
the resale Harold obtained a benefit that he kept.  Considering 
all the circumstances of this case we are satisfied that it was 
inequitable for Harold to retain the proceeds from the Reading 
Avenue property resale in the light of the duty of loyalty that he 
owed WEL.   
 C. Harold‟s Duties as Custodian for L.L.‟s Shares 
                                                                                                             
Pennsylvania law is not so rigid as to require unjust enrichment 
in every case charging liability on the basis of a breach of 
corporate fiduciary duty.  See Selheimer, 224 A.2d at 647.  
Here, Harold was on both sides of a transaction that was 
detrimental to WEL.  This conflict of interests is sufficient for 
us to hold that Harold breached his duty of loyalty to WEL. 
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 The Pennsylvania Uniform Transfers to Minors Act 
(“PUTMA”) is the successor legislation to the Pennsylvania 
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (“PUGMA”), and “provide[s] an 
inexpensive, easy way for giving property to minors.”21 
Sternlicht v. Sternlicht, 822 A.2d 732, 737 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 
 Under the PUTMA, a “person may make a transfer by 
irrevocable gift to . . . a custodian for the benefit of a minor 
pursuant to section 5309 . . . .”  20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5304 
(West 2011).  The custodian must manage the minor‟s property 
and its proceeds until the minor reaches the age of 21 years.  20 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5320 (West 2011).  Under 20 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 5309 (West 2011), a property may be held by a 
custodian when it is “registered in the name of the transferor . . . 
followed in substance by the words, „as custodian for (name of 
minor) under the Pennsylvania Uniform Transfers to Minors 
                                                 
21
 A transfer of ownership of a security to a minor under the 
PUTMA allows parents and others to make transfers to minors 
without complex legal arrangements such as creating a trust or a 
guardianship.  The PUTMA also preserves certain federal tax 
benefits to the donor.  See Sutliff v. Sutliff, 528 A.2d 1318, 
1323 (Pa. 1987) (discussing the PUGMA).  We recognize that 
the transfer to Harold as custodian was recited to be made under 
the PUGMA even though at the time of the transfer the PUTMA 
had replaced the PUGMA.  We nevertheless are applying the 
PUTMA because the notes to 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5301 
(West 2011), the title and definition section of the PUTMA, 
indicate that when the PUTMA was enacted the enacting 
legislation provided that it would apply to transfers after its 
effective date even though the transfers purport “to have been 
made under the [PUGMA.]” 
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Act‟ . . . .”  20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5309(a)(1)(i).  “Whatever 
its source, custodial property that is held pursuant to Section 
5304 is the property of the minor child.”  Sternlicht, 822 A.2d at 
737.  In managing property for a minor‟s benefit, “a custodian 
may deliver or pay to the minor or expend for the minor‟s 
benefit so much of the custodial property as the custodian 
considers advisable for the use and benefit of a minor, without 
court order . . . .”  20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5314(a) (West 
2011).     
 The PUTMA further provides:  
In dealing with custodial property, a custodian shall 
observe the standard of  care that would be observed 
by a prudent person dealing with property of  another 
and is not limited by any other statute restricting 
investments by  fiduciaries.  If a custodian has a 
special skill or expertise or is named  custodian on 
the basis of representations of a special skill or expertise, 
the custodian shall use that skill or expertise.   
20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5312(b) (West 2011).  The PUTMA 
also imposes a duty of loyalty:  “A custodian may not use 
PUTMA property to benefit himself.”  Sternlicht, 822 A.2d at 
740.  Thus, the duties owed by a custodian to a minor track 
those owed by a director to his corporation. 
 1.  Duty of care 
The Bankruptcy Court‟s conclusion that Harold did not 
violate his duties as a PUTMA custodian rested on two bases.  
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First, the Court, not distinguishing between a duty of care and a 
duty of loyalty, concluded: 
In seeking a judgment against WEL for loans and 
executing on that judgment against real property 
which WEL owned, [Harold] exercised his right 
to obtain what he was validly owed.  In doing so, 
he did not deprive [L.L.] of her nine shares of 
stock in WEL nor of any assets to which WEL 
was legally entitled. 
App. at 59.  Second, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that 
William and Theresa, being “well aware at the time of the gift to 
L.L. that [Harold] was owed money from WEL,” waived on 
L.L.‟s behalf any conflict of interest existing between Harold 
and L.L.  Id.  In considering Harold‟s duty of care as a custodian 
we pass directly to the Court‟s conclusion with respect to waiver 
inasmuch as the Court‟s first basis for its conclusion cannot 
survive with respect to the duty of care for the same reasons that 
we have held that Harold breached his duty of care to WEL as a 
director.     
 The Bankruptcy Court‟s finding of waiver cannot support 
its decision. The PUTMA does not contemplate waivers of 
conflicts of interest on the minor‟s behalf, at least in a situation 
like that here where the waiver cannot possibly benefit the 
minor.
22
   Rather, a transfer under the PUTMA “is irrevocable, 
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 We are not suggesting that there never can be a situation in 
which a custodian‟s conflict of interest with respect to dealing 
with custodial property can be waived.  After all, a waiver of the 
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and the custodial property is indefeasibly vested in the minor, 
but the custodian has all the rights, powers, duties and authority 
provided [under the PUTMA], and neither the minor nor the 
minor‟s legal representative has any right, power, duty, or 
authority with respect to custodial property except as provided 
[under the PUTMA].”  20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5311(b) (West 
2011); see 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5301 (West 2011) (defining 
“legal representative” as “[a]n individual‟s personal 
representative or guardian.”).  The PUTMA vests extensive 
management powers and duties in the custodian, and does not 
provide or imply that a minor‟s parents may ratify a custodian‟s 
decisions that may be adverse to the minor‟s interests.  See 20 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 5312, 5313, 5314.    
  2. Duty of Loyalty 
 In considering this case it is important to emphasize that 
just as Harold owed a duty of loyalty to WEL as a director, he 
owed L.L. a duty of loyalty under the PUTMA.  In considering 
whether Harold acted consistently with this duty we recognize 
that, as he points out, he did not do what the PUTMA clearly 
proscribes:  converting L.L.‟s shares or selling them and 
                                                                                                             
conflict might be in a minor‟s interest as, for example, if the 
custodian is seeking to purchase for himself custodial property 
for a price far exceeding its market value.  In that situation a 
minor well might benefit if the custodian personally brought the 
property and invested the proceeds from the sale in more 
valuable assets.  Perhaps in such a case the custodian could seek 
authority to acquire the property from a court with jurisdiction 
over such an application. 
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appropriating the proceeds.  Thus, this case differs from cases 
such as In re Gumpher, 840 A.2d 318, 323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), 
in which the court held that a mother‟s actions in liquidating a 
child‟s PUTMA account for the mother‟s immediate benefit was 
a breach of her custodial responsibilities.  However, as Payne 
observes, “[t]he stock of WEL has no inherent value.  It has 
value only to the extent that WEL owns assets and generates 
income.”  Appellant‟s br. at 27.  Thus, shares of stock cannot be 
viewed as simply sheets of paper or notations in computer 
records.  Consequently, Harold had not only a duty to look after 
the shares themselves, but also not to do anything that would 
reduce their value to L.L.‟s detriment. 
 On this point, we find the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts‟ decision in Fogelin v. Nordblom, 521 N.E.2d 
1007 (Mass. 1988), to be instructive.
23
  In Fogelin, two 
custodians held 82% of preferred shares of a business trust that 
were given to minors under the Massachusetts version of the 
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act.  After its establishment, the 
trustees executed an amendment to the trust that greatly 
diminished the liquidation value of the proposed shares.  On a 
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 Given the paucity of case law under the PUTMA, which we 
observe is a happy state of affairs, Pennsylvania courts look to 
cases decided in other jurisdictions under their versions of the 
Uniform Transfers to Minors Acts and its predecessor, the 
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, for guidance.  See In re Gumpher, 
840 A.2d at 322; 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1927 (West 2011) 
(“Statutes uniform with those of other states shall be interpreted 
and construed with their general purpose to make uniform the 
law of those states which enact them.”). 
  36 
challenge to this action, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
custodians breached their custodial duties by consenting to the 
dramatic reduction in the value of the shares .  Here, as in 
Fogelin, the circumstance that after the sale of the Reading 
Avenue property the minor retained ownership of the shares in 
WEL does not excuse Harold‟s conduct.  Payne asserts—and 
Harold does not dispute—that the sale of the Reading Avenue 
property greatly reduced the value of WEL and thus the value of 
L.L.‟s shares in that corporation.   
 Harold‟s role as the custodian for L.L.‟s shares conflicted 
with his personal interest in recovering monies WEL owed him, 
and Harold‟s entitlement to payment from WEL did not absolve 
him of his duty to manage the nine shares for L.L.‟s benefit.  
The Bankruptcy Court‟s conclusion that Harold did not breach 
his fiduciary duties because he was “validly owed” money by 
WEL only underscores the existence of his conflict of interest.  
 Harold‟s appropriation of L.L.‟s property involved 
multiple steps:  (1) suing WEL; (2) not taking steps on behalf of 
WEL to defend against the suit; (3) commencing execution 
proceedings; (4) purchasing the property; and (5) reselling it and 
retaining the proceeds.  Though Harold well may have been 
justified in instituting his action against WEL, clearly he 
breached his custodial duty of loyalty to L.L. by his actions with 
respect to the other four steps involved in his appropriation of 
the property.  A custodian‟s duties under the PUTMA are 
“analogous to those of a trustee with the broadest possible 
discretionary powers,” who “owes a fiduciary duty to the 
beneficiary.”  See Sutliff v. Sutliff, 528 A.2d 1318, 1323 (Pa. 
1987) (discussing the PUGMA).  He “violates that duty when he 
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has a personal interest in trust dealings that might affect his 
judgment.”  Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170, 
cmts. b, c (1959)).  Though a custodianship is a different legal 
entity than a trust, we believe comment b to section 170(1) of 
the Second Restatement of Trusts is applicable to the facts 
here
24
: 
A trustee with power to sell trust property is under 
a duty not to sell to himself either by private sale 
or at auction, whether the property has a market 
price or not, and whether or not the trustee makes 
a profit thereby. It is immaterial that the trustee 
acts in good faith in purchasing trust property for 
himself, and that he pays a fair consideration. 
The trustee cannot properly purchase trust 
property for himself even though he does not 
make the sale. Thus, he cannot properly purchase 
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 Though we are treating the comment as applicable here, we 
cannot help but wonder whether it overstates what should be the 
constraints on the conduct of a trustee.  See supra note 22.  After 
all, there could be a situation in which local zoning laws coupled 
with a trustee‟s personal ownership of property adjacent to the 
trust property would preclude anyone other than the trustee from 
making use of the property he holds in trust.  Thus, while the 
Restatement sets forth a bright-line rule, always much 
appreciated by judges and attorneys because of its certainty and 
easy application, in practice perhaps there should be limitations 
on it.  But in this case we are not concerned with such a situation 
in which it would be unwise to apply the Restatement rule. 
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trust property for himself on a foreclosure sale or 
tax sale or sale on execution of a judgment. To 
permit him to do so would create a situation 
where his personal interest would be in conflict 
with his duty as trustee. It is his duty as trustee to 
prevent the sale if possible or to see that the 
property is sold for as much as can be obtained. If 
he were permitted to bid in the property for 
himself at the sale, it would be for his personal 
advantage not to prevent the sale and to have as 
few bidders and as low bids as possible. The 
trustee who bids in the property for himself at 
such a sale is not permitted to keep the property, 
even though in the particular case he attempted to 
secure as many bidders and as high bids as he 
could and the amount which he bid was a fair 
consideration for the property. 
When Harold acquired and sold the Reading Avenue 
property, he effectively appropriated L.L.‟s assets.  Inasmuch as 
there was at least a dispute as to the validity of his claim against 
WEL, he violated his duty of loyalty to L.L. by his self-dealing 
actions.
25
  As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated, 
                                                 
25
 As we have indicated Payne has contended that WEL had a 
defense against Harold‟s Berks County action.  Though we are 
taking note of Payne‟s contention we are not implying that if 
Harold‟s claim against WEL was not disputed, our result would 
be different as we do not reach that issue because we are dealing 
with a disputed claim.  In this regard, we point out that the 
Pennsylvania courts at this late date almost certainly would not 
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“[w]here there is self-dealing on the part of a fiduciary, it is 
immaterial to the question of his liability in the premises 
whether he acted without fraudulent intent or whether the price 
received for his sale of trust property was fair and adequate.”  In 
re Noonan‟s Estate, 63 A.2d 80, 84 (Pa. 1949).26   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of 
the District Court entered March 9, 2011, and remand the case to 
that Court.
27
  Unless that Court retains the case it should further 
                                                                                                             
rerun the course in Harold‟s 2004 lawsuit and determine who 
would have prevailed if WEL had defended against that case.  In 
any event, Harold does not request that somehow they be given 
that opportunity. 
 
26
 As we indicated above, it is conceivable that in some 
circumstances there could be a waiver of a custodian‟s conflict 
of interest so that he could acquire the custodial property, but 
this is not such a case.  See supra note 24.   
 
27
 In its opinion the Bankruptcy Court, after acknowledging that 
some of Harold‟s “statements were self-serving,” stated that: 
 
What came across vividly to this Court was that 
this is a gentleman who supported the business 
endeavors of his son and daughter-in-law by 
providing loans to start up and then keep the 
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remand the case to the Bankruptcy Court for further 
proceedings.   Regardless of whether the District Court or the 
Bankruptcy Court takes jurisdiction on the remand the 
proceedings should be consistent with this opinion.  Inasmuch as 
we have determined that Harold breached his duties as a WEL 
director and as a custodian for L.L.‟s shares, we leave it to the 
District Court or the Bankruptcy Court, as the case may be, on 
remand to determine the relief to which Payne is entitled on his 
claim and the issue of dischargeability of Payne‟s claim in 
Harold‟s bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
                                                                                                             
business going, who after patiently waited to be 
repaid for the loans and who was finally forced to 
take action to be repaid when it because clear that 
was the only way that it was going to happen. 
 
App. at 18-19.  We do not disagree with what the Court said, but 
the problem is that Harold obtained his partial satisfaction of his 
judgment in the state-court action at the expense of L.L. and she 
was not the cause of his problems.   
